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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MARKET REALITIES V.
INDIGENOUS EQUITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate bio-prospectors will destroy the symbiosis be-
tween indigenous communities and their environment if India
fails to enact a biodiversity law to empower rural communities
in their role as guardians of traditional knowledge and part-
ners with the environment. The emergence of this growing
tension is no surprise in light of India's vast natural resources
and the generations of knowledge held by diverse indigenous
populations.' For this reason, India continues to be a prime
destination for corporate research and development. Indige-
nous knowledge, however, is extremely vulnerable to commer-
cial exploitation by national and multinational industries be-
cause it does not fall within the protection of traditional "West-
ern" intellectual property rights.2 The recent conflicts over the
1. See P.R.J. Pradeep, Making Science Mumbo Jumbo, at
http-/www.oneworld.org/cse/html/dte/dte981115/dte srep3.htm (last visited June 30,
2000). There are an estimated 53 million individuals belonging to 550 tribal com-
munities throughout India. Dr. P. Pushpangadan, IPR and Benefit Sharing in
Drug and Gene Prospecting - An Indian Experiment, at 8 (Oct. 1, 1999) (unpub-
lished report, on file with author) [hereinafter Pushpangadan].
2. The term, "Western," refers to industrialized countries as opposed to indig-
enous communities. Conventional Western science frequently does not recognize
"the value of indigenous and subsistence farmers' informal systems of knowledge-
transmission and innovation . .. the products of indigenous and local communities'
knowledge have been detached from their sociological and sociocultural base ...
Western science and industry treat the living knowledge of existing indigenous
knowledge and local communities as 'quaint' . . . . " Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds
and Shamans: The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of
Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 Mica. J. INT'L L. 919, 929 [hereinafter
Roht-Arriaza]. The North-South distinction refers to the West-East or First World-
Third World. See id. See generally Lakshmi Sarma, Comment, Bio-Piracy: Twenti-
eth Century Imperialism in the Form of International Agreements, 13 TEMP. INTL
& COmP. L.J. 107 (1999) [hereinafter Sarma]. In a paper presented at a recent
Commonwealth countries' meeting where benefit sharing and intellectual property
issues were discussed, former director and chief coordinator of the benefit sharing
project with the Kanis of Kerala, Dr. P. Pushpangadan, discussed the concept of
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'American' Basmati rice patent,' derivatives of the neem tree,4
and medicines containing the antiseptic properties of turmer-
ic,5 illustrate the nature of India's battle to protect the intel-
Traditional Knowledge Systems (TKS). He described TKS as "local community
based system(s] of knowledge which are unique to a given culture of society and
have developed as that culture has evolved over many generations of inhabiting in
a particular ecosystem. TKS is a general term which refers broadly to the collec-
tive knowledge of indigenous/local people about the relationship between people,
habitat and the ambient resources." Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 1.
3. An American company, RiceTec, successfully patented a new variety of rice
derived from a strain of "Basmati," an aromatic variety of rice indigenous to India
and Pakistan. Although the patent clearly acknowledged the distinction between
RiceTec's novel strain and that of Basmati, the Rice Growers Association of India
and Pakistan was outraged, and accused the Indian Government of surrendering
intellectual property rights for a product indigenous to South Asia. Much of the
hysteria surrounding the rice patent has faded, but a feeling of national tragedy
persists over RiceTec's use of the name 'Basmati.' South Asian Basmati rice manu-
facturers may have a strong case against RiceTec for protecting Basmati as a
geographic indication that is to be used solely for rice products from the Punjab
region of India and Pakistan. India is currently strengthening its laws on geo-
graphic indications in order to protect appellations of origin, like Basmati, against
unprotected use as a generic term for rice. Pravin Anand, In India, IP Falls On
Hard Times, at http//wwwljx.com/practice/mtellectualproperty/0506-india.html (last
visited June 30, 2000); Chidanand Rajghatta, Rice and Shine: Fragrant Basmati
Now Goes Phoren, THE INDIAN EXPRESS, Feb. 13, 1998, at 7.
4. The neem tree, commonly found in India and other parts of South and
Southeast Asia, has been used for generations by Indian farmers as a pesticide.
The seeds from the tree are crushed and soaked in water to form a pesticide
spray for plants and food crops. Neem is also used by local populations to prevent
certain skin disorders, malaria, meningitis, common colds, and influenza. In 1992,
the American company W.R. Grace & Co. procured two patents for the neem ex-
traction processes. The corporation's vice president stated that indigenous knowl-
edge of the neem plant was merely "folk medicine" and the corporation had no
intention of compensating holders and developers of the neem plant's properties in
India. Although the Indian Government filed a complaint with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, claiming the patent was an example of "biopiracy," the govern-
ment withdrew its complaint after acknowledging that the extraction processes
developed by W.R. Grace & Co. were in fact novel. See John F. Burns, Tradition
in India vs. a Patent in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1995, at D4; Roht-Arriaza,
supra note 2, at 921-922; Trade and Development Case Studies, at
http://www.itd.orglissuesindia0.htm (last visited June 16, 2000) [hereinafter Trade
and Development].
5. Turmeric contains unique properties which have traditionally been used in
India for cooking and healing wounds. When two scientists patented turmeric for
the purpose of healing wounds, the Indian Council for Scientific and Industrial
Research (CSIR) successfully challenged the validity of the patent with the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office. CSIR argued that the patented properties of turmer-
ic were already known to the public and had been practiced for generations in
India. Since such traditional practices are generally undocumented, the turmeric
case caused historians to search far back into ancient Indian texts and to a paper
published in the Journal of the Indian Medical Association to prove that turmeric
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lectual property rights (IPRs) of its natural resources, indige-
nous knowledge,' and derivative products.7 Without laws to
compel more equitable conduct, corporations 'steal' traditional
knowledge, deny local communities benefits and recognition,
and deplete natural resources. India must create biodiversity
legislation that is both a "sword and a shield"' in order to
balance the lucrative commercial opportunities for developing
indigenous knowledge with the preservation of traditional
lifestyles.9
The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD)0 is the first international agreement to address the
endangered partnership between indigenous communities with
special knowledge of their environment, and conservation of
the natural resources which these populations rely on to main-
tain their traditional lifestyles." Article 8(j) of the Convention
articulates this goal by focusing on member states' obligations
to "respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and
practices of indigenous and local communities embodying tradi-
was in fact used for centuries by Indians for various purposes. THE HINDU (BUSI-
NESS LINE) Nov. 26, 1998, at 6; Trade and Development, supra note 4.
6. Indigenous knowledge encompasses "[kinowledge, innovations and practices
of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity . . . . " United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity,
June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818, 837 (1992) [hereinafter CBD]. See also An Explanato-
ry Leaflet About the Convention on Biological Diversity, at http//www.unep.ch/bio/
bio-leaf.html (last visited June 16, 2000). This Note uses the terms "traditional,"
.community," "rural," and "indigenous" knowledge interchangeably.
7. See G. Utkarsh, Fighting Patent Wars, at http/www.ecopune.com pat-
ent.htm (last visited June 16, 2000) [hereinafter Utkarsh].
8. Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Cul-
ture: An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INTmL. LAW & COM. REG. 229,
240 (1998) [hereinafter Long].
9. Long, supra note 8, at 240.
10. The CBD came into force on December 29, 1993, and India became a
party in 1994. See generally Sarma, supra note 2; Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at
8.
11. The CBD promotes: (1) the conservation of biological diversity, (2) the
sustainable use of biological resources; and (3) the fair and equitable sharing of
resulting benefits. CBD, supra note 6. "It was the Convention on Biodiversity
negotiated at the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro in the face of hostility from the
United States and other developed countries that recognized for the first time the
right of communities to get a share in the benefits accruing from patents derived
from natural resources and genetic material which they have helped to conserve
over centuries." Patent System to Protect Traditional Knowledge, at http://www.web-
page.com/hindu/960831/05/2915c.html (last visited June 30, 2000).
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tional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable
use of biological diversity.. . " through the implementation of
national biodiversity legislation. 2
This Note proposes a legislative framework that would
fulfill India's commitment to protect its indigenous intellectual
property pursuant to the CBD's Article 8(j).13 A legislative
framework preserving open contractual negotiations between
local communities and industries, coupled with implied non-
waivable contract terms, would promote benefit sharing, in-
formed community empowerment, and fulfillment of the CBD's
goals. 4 The proposed legislation mandates the inclusion of
three implied procedural terms in each contract negotiated
between a corporation and an indigenous community. These
procedures include: (1) mandatory prior informed consent (PIC)
from indigenous communities; (2) mandatory benefit sharing
designed to suit the particular needs of each community; and,
(3) mandatory government appointed legal counsel to act on
behalf of the indigenous communities. This framework balanc-
es what are often regarded as competing interests; the natural
growth of business and commercialization of indigenous knowl-
edge, versus the protection and conservation of local communi-
ties and natural resources.15
Part II of this Note introduces a unique benefit sharing
model, 6 initiated in Southwest India, between the Kani
tribe 7 and the Tropical Botanical Garden and Research Insti-
12. Article 8, entitled In Situ Conservation, states that:
Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropri-
ate: G) Subject to [CBD member states'] national legislation, respect, pre-
serve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous
and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and promote their
wider application with the approval and involvement of the holder of
such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge,
innovations and practice ....
CBD, supra note 6.
13. See CBD, supra note 6.
14. Id.
15. See generally Sonia Baldia, Intellectual Property and Biodiversity: Conflicts
Over North-South Equity 216 (1999) (J.D. Thesis, George Washington University
Law School) (on file with the George Washington University Law School Law
Library) [hereinafter Baldia].
16. See generally Pushpangadan, supra note 1.
17. Kani refers to a rural community settled in the state of Kerala located in
the Southwestern part of India. See generally Pushpangadan, supra note 1.
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tute (TBGRI)5 to illustrate the need for greater community
empowerment and contractual safeguards for local populations
faced with bio-prospecting agreements. Part III examines the
proposal for an effective legislative framework, in light of the
CBD's goal to promote wider protection of indigenous knowl-
edge and benefit sharing with local communities. Part IV con-
cludes that until a sui generis system, recognizing the distinct
qualities of indigenous intellectual property is developed on a
national or international level, contract law is the most effec-
tive way to protect and enforce benefit sharing and equitable
use of indigenous knowledge and natural resources in develop-
ing countries such as India.
II. A CASE STUDY IN BENEFIT SHARING: THE KANI TRIBE
The benefit sharing model initiated by the TBGRI with the
Kani tribe illustrates the need for procedural safeguards to
secure fair and equitable terms for indigenous communities
transferring knowledge and resources to corporate bio-prospec-
tors.9 At first blush, the TBGRI's benefit sharing scheme
appears to achieve an ideal balance: sincere concern for overall
tribal welfare coupled with facilitation of the productive use of
tribal knowledge. The TBGRI, as a local Indian governmental
research institute, is well versed in the Kani tribe's language,
customs, and traditional lifestyle. It is primarily concerned
with research and development rather than purely profit seek-
ing motives. Even in this optimal climate, however, the
TBGRI-Kani framework is prone to several weaknesses, and
this reveals the futility of replicating such a model for
bioprospecting agreements involving large multinationals. In
the absence of Indian biodiversity legislation, and the undeni-
able incentive for corporations to disregard indigenous people
18. The TBGRI is located in Kerala's Thiruvananthapuram district. This au-
tonomous organ of the state government was created in 1955 for the purpose of
studying and formulating practices to sustain and conserve natural resources in
the region, and to carry out chemical and pharmacological research on plants for
medicinal drugs. The TBGRI currently assumes control over the Kani project. See
Tony Reichhardt, 'Indian Ginseng' Brings Royalties for Tribe, NATURE, May 16,
1999, at 182 [hereinafter NATURE]. See generally Pushpangadan, supra note 1.
19. This rudimentary benefit sharing proposal was voluntarily assumed by the
TBGRI, as there was, and remains, no legal requirement to return benefits to the
local communities responsible for sustaining and providing indigenous knowledge
and resources to transnational corporations. See Pushpangadan, supra note 1.
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as equal bargaining partners, relationships based solely on
trust and mutual respect, such as the TBGRI-Kani experience,
are unreliable as models for future contractual negotiations
over indigenous intellectual property.
A. The Discovery of Arogyapacha and the Initiation of a
Benefit Sharing Model
Once a nomadic community, the Kani tribes people are
presently settled in the Agasthiya Hills of the Western Ghat
mountain range in Southwest India. ° In 1998, the population
of the Kani tribe was approximately 16,000, or an estimated
2,500 families.2' Like many rural communities in India, the
tribe is poor and maintains its traditional lifestyle amidst the
rapid modernization and proliferation of surrounding Indian
cities.22 The tribals earn their income through the handicraft
trade23 and through the cultivation of minor plants and cash
crops. 4
The Kanis are particularly well renowned for their "sure-
fire antidotes" 5 and knowledge of the dense forest which they
populate." The region is richly inhabited by a myriad of
plants potentially holding countless medicinal remedies2"
known and cultivated for generations by the Kani tribals.2 s In
1987, two local Indian researchers2" explored the lush
20. Benefit Sharing Model Experimented by Tropical Botanic Garden and Re-
search Institute (TBGRI), A National Center of Excellence on Tropical Plant Diver-
sity, Ministry of Environment & Forests, Government of India, at httpAvww.bio-
div.org/chm/techno/Casestudies__pdf/India.PDF (last visited June 30, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Government of India]; NATURE, supra note 18, at 182.
21. Id. See also Down to Earth, How to Sell a Wonder Herb, at
http://www.oneworld.orglcse/html/dte/dte981115/dte-cover.htm (last visited June 16,
2000) [hereinafter Wonder Herb].
22. See Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 8.
23. Id.
24. See R.V. Anuradha, Sharing with the Kanis: A Case Study from Kerala,
India, at http://www.biodiv.org/chm/techno/casestudies pdf/Kanis.pdf (last visited
June 30, 2000) [hereinafter Anuradhal.
25. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
26. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21; Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 8-9.
27. See Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 8-9.
28. See id.
29. Dr. P. Pushpangadan (former director of the TBGRI and currently at the
National Botanical Research Institute) and S. Rajasekharan (currently an
ethnobotanist at the TBGRI) were the first to be introduced by the Kanis to
Tricopus zeylanicus. Note that the researchers were not affiliated with the TBGRI
at the time of discovery, but the research and development was transferred to the
[Vol. XXVI:31152
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Agasthiya Hills" under the auspices of a government spon-
sored initiative called the All India Coordinated Research Pro-
ject on Ethnobotany (AICRPE).3' Guided through the forest by
two Kani tribe members,3 2 the researchers observed their na-
tive guides chewing the seeds of a mysterious plant. Immedi-
ately after ingesting the plant, the tribals gained a visible
burst of energy.33 The scientists, curious about the startling
effect of the plant, inquired about its identity, and the Kanis'
knowledge of it. The researchers made oral guarantees to the
Kani guides that if some useful scientific and medicinal prop-
erties could be isolated and further developed into a market-
able drug, half of the proceeds would be shared with the
Kanis 
34
Through the local Kani guides,"5 the researchers were
introduced to the benefits of Tricopus zeylanicus (subspecies:
travancoricus).3' "[T]he world did not know about this unique
plant until the Kani people led us to it," commented one of the
original AICRPE researchers. Tricopus zeylanicus, also re-
ferred to as "Arogyapacha,"5 is indigenous to parts of Kerala,
the neighboring state of Tamil Nadu, as well as Sri Lanka and
Malaysia.39 However, subspecies travancoricus, the particular
variety known to the Kanis, is solely indigenous to India. °
After experimentation with Tricopus zeylanicus, a research
TBGRI once Dr. P. Pushpangadan was appointed Director. Id.
30. The Agasthiya Hills are located in the Western Ghat mountain range of
Kerala, India.
31. AICRPE was initiated by the Man and Biosphere Programme of the Unit-
ed Nations Economic, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 1982.
Note that at this time the TBGRI had not been in control of the project; however,
they eventually assumed such control. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21. "AICRPE
was essentially a multidisciplinary, multiinstitutional and action-oriented research
programme. It aimed at generating and documenting the multidimensional perspec-
tives of the tribal life culture, traditions and knowledge systems associated with
the utilization of the local biological and other natural resources." Government of
India, supra note 20; Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 8.
32. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
33. See NATURE, supra note 18, at 182.
34. See Government of India, supra note 20.
35. See Government of India, supra note 20.
36. See Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 10.
37. See NATURE, supra note 18, at 182.
38. Arogyapacha literally means "green health" in Malayalam, the language
spoken in Kerala. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
39. See Government of India, supra note 20.
40. Anuradha, supra note 24, at 4; Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 10.
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team isolated an active ingredient and reported that it possibly
contained "immune enhancing properties and liver protecting
qualities."4' The TBGR 42 proceeded to develop a herbal for-
mulation derived from 15% of the plant's active ingredient43
and called it Jeevani.' In November 1995, after negotiating
with several drug companies, the TBGRI sold the licensing
rights and manufacturing technology for Jeevani45 to the Arya
Vaidya Pharmacy of Coimbatore (AVP) for ten lakhs,5 ap-
proximately 22,000 U.S. dollars,47 for a period of seven
years.48 The TBGRI also obtained a patent for the unique
formulation, which is currently held by the Institute.49
Pursuant to the terms of the initial knowledge transfer,
the TBGRI reiterated the promise of the AICRPE researchers
to share 50% of the licensing fee paid by the AVP for the tech-
nology transfer of Jeevani, as well as one-half of the 2% royal-
41. Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 10.
42. Although the TBGRI reported that the Arogyapacha plant has special
immune enhancing properties, it added that the plant extraction was one of sever-
al active ingredients developed by TBGRI researchers to create a unique herbal
formulation. Id. at 11.
43. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
44. Jeevani was ready for commercial sale in 1990. There is no dispute that
the patent right to Jeevani, held by the TBGRI, is valid. Nor does this Note imply
that there is any obligation under current Indian law to implement benefit sharing
models or protective measures for indigenous intellectual property. At the inception
of this project, the TBGRI was under no obligation to give anything back to the
Kani community. However, the researchers created an obligation when they made
oral promises to share half of any benefits arising from the development of
Arogyapacha with the Kanis. See Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 9. Jeevani
means "life-giver." Neelesh Misra, Indian Tribesman Look to Profit from Energy, at .
http://www.stardem.comlap/world/0402tribal.html (last visited Aug. 23, 1999) [here-
inafter Misral.
45. See Misra, supra note 44.
46. Arya Vaidya Pharmacy (Coimbatore) Ltd. is a leading private manufactur-
er of Ayurvedic drugs. Wonder Herb, supra note 21; Arya Vaidya Pharmacy, at
http://www.avpayurveda.orgproducts.htm (last visited June 16, 2000).
47. The currency of India is the rupee. As of November 5, 2000, the exchange
rate is 45.60 rupees = 1 U.S. dollar. One Lakh = 100,000 rupees. Bamex Currency
Exchange, at http'J/www.bamex.com/currencyexchangerates.html (last visited Novem-
ber 5, 2000). Note that the TBGRI tried to get Jeevani patented in the name of
the tribe, according to Dr. P. Pushpangadan, but Indian patent law would not
permit it. See Letter from P. Pushpangadan to Author, National Botanical Re-
search Institute (Oct. 1, 1999) (unpublished letter, on file with author); Wonder
Herb, supra note 21.
48. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
49. See Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 8.
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ty that the TBGRI would receive from the AVP.5 ° In ex-
change, Kani tribe members were enlisted by the AVP and the
TBGRI to cultivate and collect Arogyapacha plants.51 Once
the agreement was finalized between the AVP and TBGRI, the
Kerala state government's Integrated Tribal Development
Project collaborated with the TBGRI to develop settlements for
the Kanis to begin large scale cultivation of plants. 2 Fifty
families were selected by the TBGRI to cultivate Arogyapacha
over 20.25 hectares of land." Each family reportedly received
Rs.1,000 at the inception of the project and the TBGRI subse-
quently purchased Rs.30 per kilogram of Arogyapacha.54 The
AVP independently offered the tribals Rs.100" per kilogram
of raw plant material.56
After one and a half years of the Kanis' successful collec-
tion and cultivation of plants, the state government of Kerala
halted the export of Arogyapacha from the Agasthiya forest.
Kerala's Chief Conservator of Forests57 declared that under
state law, Arogyapacha is a strictly protected forest product
that people are prohibited from removing." Due to the bulk of
tropical forest reserves in the Agasthiya region, all plants
extracted from the forest are vigilantly protected by the state
government under the Indian Forest Act of 1927,"9 and access
is highly restricted by the State Forest Department.0 Thus,
the Kanis were forbidden by state law to continue their culti-
vation and removal of Arogyapacha.61 State officials explained
50. See Anuradha, supra note 24.
51. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Anuradha, supra note 24.
58. See Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 12. A vigilance officer of the Chief
Conservator of Forests commented that "Arogypacha is a 'rare plant' and is contra-
band in the free market." The Central Wild Life Act and Kerala Forest Act pro-
hibit anyone from collecting or transferring plants outside of the forest unless it is
included in the small list of products that may be removed in small quantities
from the protected forests. Vinu Abraham, Nipped in the Bud, at
http'J/www.theweek.com/97novO9/events4.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 1999) [hereinaf-
ter Nipped in the Bud].
59. See Government of India, supra note 20.
60. See Government of India, supra note 20.
61. See Nipped in the Bud, supra note 58.
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that the small amount which the Kanis traditionally procured
for personal use was acceptable, but the large quantities smug-
gled from the forest for the production of Jeevani was ille-
gal.6" The state's primary concern was that large scale de-
mand of Arogyapacha would lead the Kanis to "remove the
plants from the natural population of this species [of
Arogyapachal in the forest and thereby make it endan-
gered."
63
The ban on Arogyapacha drove many Kani tribes people to
turn to the illegal collection of plant material because private
nurseries continued to offer them compensation.' Eventually,
due to the drought in supply, the AVP's requirements for
Arogyapacha far exceeded the supply, and the production of
Jeevani was halted by the pharmacy for an entire year.65 The
AVP desperately proposed a plan to assure controlled cultiva-
tion and collection of Arogyapacha and to alleviate the Forest
Department's concerns that Jeevani production would hinder
sustainable use of Arogyapacha.66 The AVP's plan involved an
offer to supply the Kanis with money to buy seeds and inde-
pendently initiate the large scale cultivation of Arogyapacha.
Therefore, larger numbers of Kanis could be employed and the
pharmacy would buy back the leaves at a rate of five tons per
month." The Forest Department, however, refused the pro-
posal. The AVP pointed to the "irony of the situation" because
the "TBGRI as part of the State Government had licensed [the]
AVP to manufacture the drug; whereas the Forest Department
which is also part of the State Government is not facilitating
the manufacturing process." 6 Although the reasons are un-
62. "The scientists from TBGRI themselves admit that this may endanger
Arogyapacha plants and so we cannot allow the transfer of the plants from the
reserve forests," stated the Chief Conservator of Forests, T.M. Manoharan. Nipped
in the Bud, supra note 58.
63. Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 12. "Being a perennial plant once planted,
it will remain there about 25-30 years after which replantation may be required."
Id.
64. "The Scientists at TBGRI believe that the medicinal properties of the
leaves of the plant are most pronounced in plants occurring in the wild, or which
are cultivated in the [Agasthiya] forest area." Anuradha, supra note 24. Therefore,
the possibility of collecting the Arogypacha plant from other regions where collec-
tion of the plant is legal, or breeding the plant in a botanical garden do not ap-
pear to be viable options. Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
65. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
66. See Anuradha, supra note 24.
67. Id.
68. Anuradha described the conflicting government policies as "illustrative of
1156 [Vol. =XV:3
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clear, the former director of the TBGRI stated in a published
report that the Forest Department eventually lifted its ban to
include Tricopus zeylanicus in its list of forest products which
the Kanis could legally export from the state protected for-
ests.69
In November 1997, the TBGRI and a few Kanis organized
the Kerala Kani Samudaya Kshema Trust (Trust)70 in order
to facilitate the transfer of licensing proceeds and royalties
from the sale of Jeevani.7 According to R.V. Anuradha," the
decision to organize the Trust was made at a local meeting
consisting of forty tribal members.72 The objective of the Trust
deed is the promotion of "welfare and development activities
for Kanis in Kerala, preparation of a biodiversity register to
document the knowledge base of the Kanis, and evolving and
supporting methods to promote sustainable use and conserva-
tion of biological resources."73 The Trust was structured so
that Kani families involved with the TBGRrs project could
enlist themselves as members of the Trust. 4
Today, the TBGRI reports that approximately sixty-per-
cent of the Kani families in Kerala are members of the
Trust.' The Trust is owned and managed by the Kanis them-
selves76 and the positions of President and Vice-President are
filled by the two original Kani guides who disclosed the tribe's
knowledge to researchers in 1987.77 Despite the organization
how the confusion exists because the different actors are not very sure of how to
react [or] what their role should be." He added that "[the irony of the situation is
that TBGRI, the Forest Department and KIRTADS are all part of the same State
government, among whom there seems to be no co-ordination or even a mecha-
nism for dialogue." Anuradha, supra note 24.
69. See P.K. Surendran, Tribals Get Intellectual, Commercial Rights over Herb-
al Drug, TIMES OF INDIA, Mar. 24, 1999, at http'//www.timesofindia.comto-
day/24indi24.htm (last visited June 30, 2000) [hereinafter Surendran];
Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 12.
70. The Kerala Kani Samudaya Kshema Trust was registered in 1998 with
nine members of the Kani tribe. "Samudaya" means community, and "Kshema"
means welfare in Malayalam, the language spoken in Kerala. Pushpangadan, su-
pra note 1, at 12; Anuradha, supra note 24, at 10.
71. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
72. See Anuradha, supra note 24, at 10.
73. Id.
74. See Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 8.
75. See Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 11.
76. Id.
77. See Surendran, supra note 69. In addition to the TBGRI's promised per-
centage of the profits and licensing fee, "[tihe Trust has also resolved to give Rs.
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of a Trust, the actual transfer of the funds was delayed by the
State Tribal Welfare Department and the Forest Depart-
ment."8 The TBGRI, which began setting aside the Kanis'
share of the licensing fees and royalties in a separate bank
account since the inception of the project, failed to receive
clearance from the state government to transfer the money to
the Trust until February 1999."9 The Kanis' current share of
the Trust includes "the license fee and royalties received on
account of the drug 'Jeevani'. . . in the form of [a] fixed asset
of the Trust and only the interest accrued from this amount
alone can be used for the welfare activities of the Kani
tribe."" What that actually means for the Kanis is cryptic.
B. Weaknesses of the TBGRI-Kani Benefit Sharing Model
Although this laudable benefit sharing initiative is hailed
by its architects as* the first of its kind,"' indigenous commu-
nities are guaranteed to encounter unscrupulous corporations,
holding far less regard for benefit sharing than the TBGRI.
The TBGRI's initiative was, admittedly, the first of its kind in
India to incorporate principles of equitable sharing and the
preservation of indigenous knowledge, as promulgated by the
CBD."2 Without pro-active biodiversity legislation, however,
there is little incentive for corporations to adequately protect
the rights of indigenous communities. With India's emergence
as a friendlier marketplace for international and national cor-
porations," the need for indigenous intellectual property safe-
guards increases. The current unregulated contractual model
threatens to facilitate the upheaval of indigenous communities
and exploitation of the country's natural resources.'
50,000 as a reward to three tribesman who had imparted the secrets of the plant
to the TBGRI scientists." Id.
78. See Surendran, supra note 69.
79. Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 11.
80. Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 12.
81. Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 13.
82. Nipped in the Bud, supra note 58.
83. See generally Baldia, supra note 15.
84. Id,
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III. DEVELOPING A FRAMEWORK FOR INDIA'S BIODIVERSITY
LEGISLATION
Although the Indian government's effort to construct
biodiversity legislation began upon India's accession to the
CBD, the numerous proposals and draft bills have yet to trans-
late into a workable product."5 The proposed legislation has
failed to garner the same sense of urgency among Parliament
members, as was the case with the Patents Amendment Act."6
One explanation for the differing political reactions is that the
impetus behind the Patents Amendment Act was primarily
international, and the required changes in India's patent laws
were clearly defined. The CBD's mandate to enact national
legislation, however, is less structured and purposely left to
the discretion of member states. 7 The Indian Government,
alone, bears the task of creating legislation which is appropri-
ate for both its indigenous communities and highly demanded
natural resources.
85. Little is known about the draft Bill that is currently under construction.
According to the expert committee in charge of the draft legislation, the Indian
governmenfs latest draft proposal includes: (1) the implementation of a National
Biodiversity Board to regulate and manage resources and state and community
boards to enforce at the local level; (2) local biodiversity registers to maintain local
knowledge bases and access to knowledge; (3) "notification of biodiverse areas;"
and, (4) benefit sharing models. India May Control Patenting with National
Biodiversity Board, at http://ens.lycos.com/enslapr99/
1999L-04-16-08.html (last visited June 30, 2000). However, the draft of the legisla-
tion has remained, for the most part, confidential. The National Biodiversity Board
would regulate access to India's natural resources and prevent the exploitation of
indigenous community knowledge "by assessing the values and fixing base prices."
Id. In addition, the board would have the power to oversee commercial contractual
agreements and the general national situation. Id.
86. Biodiversity Legislation Derailed, at http://members.tripod.com/sdnp-ind/bio-
div/newslbl-20-5-biolegis.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2000).
87. India felt tremendous pressure from WIPO, WTO, and countries such as
the United States, to enact laws that would conform with the internationally
agreed standards set out by TRIPs. Specifically, by adopting internationally recog-
nized standards, foreign entities are ensured recognition and protection for their
product patents within India and Indian patents are similarly recognized abroad.
India, in turn, becomes an easier and more attractive place to obtain a patent and
host transnational business activity. India Agrees to Abide by Two Major Patent
Treaties, at 10/13/98 DJINS 22:55:00 thereinfafter India Agrees].
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A. Indigenous Knowledge and Intellectual Property
The popular misconception that traditional knowledge is
'unscientific' contributes to its diluted protection under current
intellectual property regimes." This notion arises from the
typical characteristics of indigenous knowledge and the domi-
nance of Western intellectual property laws.89 Indigenous
knowledge is passed orally among individuals, generally re-
mains undocumented, is rarely reduced to specific technological
processes or chemically isolated properties, and is not tested in
conventional laboratories for accuracy and consistency."
Patent laws grant inventors a temporary monopoly over
certain subject matter which statisfy the conditions of patent-
ability.9 In the U.S., for example, an invention only may be
patented if it is novel, useful, and non-obvious.2 The conven-
tional framework of patent law, regarded as "almost similar
worldwide," is inapplicable to indigenous knowledge because it
fails to meet well established patentability requirements;
namely, the subject matter requirements. First, traditional
knowledge falls astray from the category of patentable inven-
tions because it lacks novelty." Since whole communities pos-
sess the same information, there is no opportunity to identify a
"first" innovator. Second, indigenous knowledge rarely meets
the requirement of non-obviousness, because there is no 'inven-
tive step.'95 Discoveries and observations, whether of plants,
88. The North's narrow definition of intellectual property, one that excludes
indigenous knowledge, has been criticized because it facilitates the theft of tradi-
tional knowledge and creativity. See Sarma, supra note 2, at 107.
89. "Most intellectual property law models are based on Western, capitalist
philosophy, and indeed appear to be developed with such a world view in mind.
The mere fact that works of intellectual creativity and innovation, so-called "works
of the mind," are granted the status of protectable individual property itself repre-
sents a Western view. It is no coincidence that intellectual property rights were
first recognized in Western Europe where individual ownership of property was
possible." Long, supra note 8, at 246; Vandana Shiva, The Politics Of Knowledge
at the CBD, at http:J/wwwsouthside.org.sg/souths/twn/title/cbd-cn.htm (last visited
June 30, 2000) [hereinafter Shiva]; Baldia, supra note 15, at 206.
90. Shiva, supra note 89; Joel L. Swerdlow, Nature's 8, NATIONAL GEOGRAPH-
IC, Apr. 2000, at 11.
91. Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 3.
92. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
93. Baldia, supra note 15, at 206. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,
333 U.S. 127 (1948).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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animals or biological processes, are excluded from patent pro-
tection because they do not promote "technical, economic and
social progress."" Instead, indigenous knowledge is usually
acquired and perceived by indigenous communities amongst a
mixture of conditions which are often inseparable from the
context of traditional customs, practices and the environ-
ment.97 Third, due to the drastically increased demand for
natural resources and traditional knowledge from bio-prospec-
tors, indigenous communities only have recently recognized the
need to document and protect their knowledge. Aside from
ancient scriptures and texts, knowledge is still transferred by
oral tradition. Fourth, as many opponents of IPRs in India
suggest, the concept of attaching property rights to generations
of accumulated knowledge is foreign and perplexing to indige-
nous populations." Changes in the perception of traditional
knowledge-from community property to commercial commodi-
ty-requires a drastic shift in the local populations' ideology.99
B. Balancing the Protection and Commercialization of
Indigenous Knowledge
India is currently experiencing a cultural, political and
ideological shift in favor of intellectual property protection as
evidenced by its willingness to be bound by international intel-
lectual property standards. This gradual change in sentiment
follows the Indian public's recent backlash against the very
notion of intellectual property, spurned by international contro-
versies over basmati rice, neem and turmeric, 10 and the per-
ceived exploitation of India's natural resources and indigenous
knowledge by transnational corporations. The decision to em-
brace international intellectual property standards has allowed
India "to utilize demanded-for intellectual property rights as a
96. Id. at 205.
97. In order to accommodate this expansion of the notion of intellectual prop-
erty, a sui generis system may be created. This Note does not attempt to explore
the possibilities of a sui generis system, as it is a broad and lengthy discussion
which exceeds the scope of this article.
98. See Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 2. See also Usha Lee McFarling,
Nature's Vanishing Pharmacy, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 3, 1994, at 25.
99. See generally Long, supra note 8.
100. Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as
last revised, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris
Convention].
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sword and shield against deculturizing forces of globalization
and foreign investment."'0 ' India's acknowledgment of the
emerging international intellectual property standards estab-
lished by industrialized nations began in 1994 with its acces-
sion to the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS).' 2 Thereafter, India signed the Par-
is Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris
Convention)0 3 and the Patent Cooperation Treaty14 pursu-
ant to its obligations under the TRIPS agreement. Although
American patent attorneys hailed this development as "long
awaited" and "necessary for India,"' 5 concerns continuously
raised by persistent Indian opposition groups are a stern re-
minder that the Indian Government must remain vigilant
about protecting its indigenous communities from exploitation
and deculturization.
101. Long, supra note 8, at 240.
102. India ratified the World Trade Organization Agreement on April 15, 1994,
and thus the TRIPS Agreement as well. Pursuant to this international agreement,
India committed itself to reform its intellectual property laws within ten years, in
order to comply with fellow members' standards. This included a revision of the
Patent Act of 1970 to include the recognition of product patents in addition to
process patents. Indian patent law formerly only granted process patent rights
making it difficult for foreigners holding product patents to protect their rights in
India. In addition the length of the term for patent protection must be extended
from seven years to twenty years, and the product patents will extend to branches
of technology not currently covered by India's laws. See Sudhir D. Ahuja, IP Trea-
ties Show Little Effect In India, THE HINDU, Nov. 24, 1998, at 8.
103. India signed the Paris Convention in August 1998. Accession to the Paris
Convention allowed India to be a part of the Patent Cooperation Treaty enabling
automatic patent recognition in all member states with a simple filing in one
country. Compliance with the Convention required India to amend the Designs Act
1911 and the Patents Act 1970. The Patents Act 1970 provides little patent pro-
tection for pharmaceuticals. Patent Untruths-I The Misconceptions about Intellectu-
al Property, THE STATESMAN, Sept. 9, 1998, at 1998 W.L. 17360146.
104. Amy Louise Kazmin, India Set to Sign Paris Convention, at
http'/lwww.ljx.com/practicelintellectualproperty/0824indiaparis.html (last visited June
30, 2000).
105. "India has finally recognized that they have to play by the same rules as
everyone else. That is to be applauded," stated a U.S. patent attorney, Gerard
Norton. See India Agrees, supra note 87. It is "unfortunate that we have created
an impression in the world that India does not believe in or respect IPRs, more
so, when we claim that we possess the second largest reservoir of scientists, engi-
neers and skilled technical manpower in the world. The world finds it difficult to
understand the dissonance between the assertion of our brainpower strength and
our aversion to the recognition of a rewarding of IPRs in the country," observed
the author of the article Patent Untruths-I The Misconceptions About Intellectual
Property. Patent Untruths, 1998 W.L. 17360146.
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With the advent of an integrated global economy, and
pressing transnational environmental concerns, the drafters of
the CBD adopted a synergistic approach to the protection of
biological diversity, indigenous communities, and sovereignty
over natural resources by encouraging an "integrated approach
to environmental protection."' The Convention was the first
to advance the notion that indigenous knowledge is an expan-
sion of intellectual property, and thus entitled to equally strin-
gent protection. By steering international awareness toward
the relationship between the world's natural resources and
"humanity's economic and social development," the CBD af-
fords India the opportunity to shape its laws in response to
this changing partnership. 7
The Indian government, private sector, and scientific com-
munity stand to gain a significant niche in the global market-
place by capitalizing on the untapped potential flowing from
the dissemination, expansion, and commercialization of indige-
nous knowledge.' The booming market for the conversion of
raw materials to "diversified value added products"0 9 is a
powerful incentive for the government to create an optimal cli-
mate for industries seeking to commercialize and procure IPRs
in India."' Ultimately, success rests on the government's
ability to promote sustainable use of natural resources and to
protect the communities holding indigenous knowledge."'
Safeguarding the intellectual property held by India's diverse
rural communities is just as significant, if not more pressing,
106. Alexandre Kiss, International Environmental Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF LAWS 13 (Kluwer Law International 1998), at 48.
107. Long, supra note 8, at 240.
108. One of twelve 'megadiversity' regions in the world, the Indian subcontinent
encompasses 8% of the entire globe's biological diversity. With 46,000 plant species
and 81,000 animal species, India is regarded around the world as a rich source for
agricultural, medicinal, cosmetic, and industrial products and other chemicals of
commercial importance. See 125 Days of New Government New Programmes and
Initiatives, at http://envfor.nic.in/mef/125days/125days.htm (last visited June 16,
2000); Government of India, supra note 20.
109. Government of India, supra note 20.
110. Multinational pharmaceuticals such as "Hoechst, Sandoz, Cargill, Unilever,
Ciba-Geigy and Merck" have all started pouring money into India for research and
development ventures in the hopes of tapping into India's vast biogenetic resourc-
es. Baldia, supra note 15, at 205.
111. Id.
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as the growth and globalization of India's commercial mar-
kets.1
2
C. General Framework and Goals
The conventional contract model, supplemented by im-
plied, non-waivable statutory terms pursuant to Article 8(j),
would provide the most comprehensive protection for indige-
nous knowledge, without extinguishing the flexibility and free-
dom to customize mutually attractive contract terms with bio-
prospectors."' Currently, the mode of transaction between
local communities and transnational businesses takes the form
of unrestricted negotiations devoid of safety mechanisms to
assure fair dealings."4 Since these transactions are not aug-
mented by supervisory legislation, benefit sharing and mutual-
ly agreed terms are rare commodities.1 '
Conditions which are specifically required by the CBD,
and necessary to incorporate in India's biodiversity legislation,
include: (1) prior informed consent (PIC) for the purpose of full
disclosure and voluntary participation; (2) mandatory benefit
sharing; and, (3) access to legal counsel to equalize local
communities' bargaining power with businesses. Finally, evi-
dence of the Indian government's bureaucracy and conflicting
political interests suggests that governmental interference
beyond the enactment and enforcement of biodiversity legisla-
tion would create confusion and decrease efficiency. The gov-
ernment would better serve as a regulatory body, without veto
power over the substantive terms of contracts. Legislation
incorporating these interests promulgates freedom of contract
as well as the paternal instincts of the CBD.
1. Prior Informed Consent
PIC is one of the most important tools that indigenous
communities may use to demand full disclosure, active partici-
pation, and authority to accept proposed bio-prospecting agree-
ments."' Written PIC is mandated in the text of the CBD to
112. See generally Baldia, supra note 15.
113. See Baldia, supra note 15, at 1-8.
114. Anuradha, supra note 24, at 2.
115. See Baldia, supra note 15, at 194.
116. In 1991, U.S. Pharmaceutical, Merck, and a Costa Rican non-profit govern-
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reinforce indigenous communities' sovereignty over the natural
resources which are so intertwined in the communities' tradi-
tional lifestyle. Corporations, in seeking new medicinal knowl-
edge and resources for commercial use, threaten to disrupt
rural communities by altering the balance of resources, creat-
ing competition within communities, and imposing accelerated
modernization.
To counter such negative effects, local communities must
possess the power to determine the extent and strength of
proposed benefit sharing and bioprospecting terms. Truly in-
formed consent hinges on the full disclosure of information, in
conjunction with community access to legal counsel. "Such
contracts are not uncommon in Peru, Phillippines or Africa. To
provide teeth to such contracts, it is necessary to modify the
IPR legislation to enforce submission of relevant con-
tract/transfer agreements as a proof of the prior informed con-
sent."117 The Andean Pact, comprised of Bolivia, Columbia,
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, has developed a proposal
whereby patents and other intellectual property rights would
only be granted upon a presentation of an application and
signed contract as proof of prior informed consent." 8
The language of the CBD's Article 8(j), referring to the
"approval and involvement of the holders of such knowledge,
innovations and practices," 9 has been interpreted by the
drafters of the Convention to require that provisions on access
to genetic resources and indigenous knowledge must be based
on "prior informed consent (PIC) and mutually agreed terms
(MATs)."1" In an explanatory guide to the key terms of Arti-
cle 8(j), the drafters of the CBD discussed three fundamental
factors to be considered in appraising the adequacy of PIC by
ment research organization, INBio, contractually agreed to transfer chemical ex-
tracts from local plants and animals in exchange for technology transfers, royalties
and a front end fee. The success of the INBio-Merck Agreement was premised on
the concept of mutually agreed terms. See Baldia, supra note 15, at 192.
117. Utkarsh, supra note 7.
118. See Graham Dutfield, The Andean Pact Common System on Access to
Genetic Resources: A Commentary, at http://www.users.ox.ac.uk/-wgtrr/andpa-
comm.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2000).
119. CBD, supra note 6.
120. CBD: Elaboration of Key Terms of Article 8(j) and Related Provisions in
Articles 10(c), and 17.2 and 18.4., at http'/www.biodiv.org/indig/tkbd-4e.htm (last
visited June 16, 2000) [hereinafter Key Terms].
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indigenous communities: 2' "[h]olders of traditional knowl-
edge will need to (1) feel secure in tenure arrangements re-
garding their traditional land, forest and marine/inland water
estates; (2) feel reassured that they have been accorded equal
status to the other members of the partnerships; and, (3) be
convinced of a common purpose compatible with their cultural
and ecological values."'22
In the case of the Kanis, there is no evidence that either
the tribe or the two Kani guides, gave prior informed consent
to the transfer of their indigenous knowledge or to the pro-
posed use and benefit sharing arrangement, as defined in the
text of the CBD. R.V. Anuradha, an attorney from New Delhi,
India, who closely researched the Kani model for the Founda-
tion for International Law and Development (FIELD),'23 re-
ported that the tribals regarded their knowledge of the
Arogyapacha plant as a sacred tribal secret.124 In an abstract
submitted by the TBGRI to the Executive Secretary at the
third meeting of the Conference of the Parties for the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity (TBGRI Abstract)," research sci-
entists divulged that Kani guides had been extremely reluctant
to .disclose any information about Arogyapacha.'26 The TBGRI
Abstract also acknowledged that in order to encourage the
Kanis to reveal their knowledge, researchers convinced the
tribals that any information they received from the Kanis
would not be misused. 127
Though the TBGRI maintains that the tribe was involved
and informed throughout the planning stages, these disclo-
sures only occurred after the original scientists unilaterally
initiated the project. The focus of a PIC requirement is full
disclosure and documentation by both parties of future expec-
tations and intentions. In this case, there is no indication that
the two Kanis who disclosed the tribe's indigenous knowledge
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Government of India, supra note 20.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Kuttinathan Kani, one of the two tribals who led researchers to the plant
said, "[r]ight in 1987, the scientists had promised the Kani tribals due share from
any profit arising from research based on the plants we showed them." Wonder
Herb, supra note 21.
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were representative of the entire tribe's interest. In addition, it
is unlikely that the Kani guides were informed of the implica-
tions of bioprospecting- such as the strain on the surrounding
natural resources which could drastically alter the Kanis' tra-
ditional lifestyle and environment. The team of researchers
who continued the Arogyapacha project, under the auspices of
the TBGRI, also failed to document their intentions and their
promises to pay the Kanis half of any profit received from the
development of Arogyapacha until the project was well under-
way. The Kanis' eventual disclosure to researchers was a prod-
uct of coercion and faith that the TBGRI was not acting in a
purely self interested manner.2 '
2. Mandatory Benefit Sharing
In compliance with the CBD Article 8(j)'s objective to con-
serve biological diversity and to protect traditional knowledge,
Indian biodiversity legislation must provide a legal framework
mandating benefit sharing partnerships between local commu-
nities and bioprospecting companies.'29 According to the
CBD's explanatory report on key terms, "[the practical rela-
tionship between access-control and benefit-sharing must be
fleshed out on national and local levels.""' The proposed
biodiversity legislation should include this requirement for any
national or transnational entity interested in using indigenous
knowledge and natural resources for commercial purposes,
such that the contractual model is tailored to the particular
community and the nature of the transaction. The CBD's broad
requirements, subject to individual customization, allow great-
er potential for success because the bioprospecting agreements
will accurately reflect the needs of India's diverse communities
and cultures, and the local and national capabilities for legisla-
tive implementation.3 '
Biodiversity legislation requires a form of benefit sharing
between industry and local communities in which the mutually
negotiated incentives are formulated to be of legitimate value
to the community. The CBD's Article 8(j) states that member
128. See Anuradha, supra note 24.
129. Key Terms, supra note 120.
130. Id.
131. CBD, supra note 6.
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states must "encourage the equitable sharing of the benefits
arising from the utilization of such knowledge, innovations and
practice .... .""' The explanatory report of Article 8(j)'s key
terms clarifies this clause by stating that "[almong the results
and benefits that may be shared are payment for access to
specimens, royalties, data, technology, capacity building, train-
ing, joint research, equitable sharing-refers to the benefit-
sharing mutually agreed upon by the parties to the Research
Agreement." 3' It is important to note that "[mlembers of in-
digenous communities may not want royalties or patent rights
because such compensation may not be part of their sys-
tem.'3 4
One of the key elements of the CBD is the sustainable,
non-destructive use of biodiversity."3' This is also a valuable
incentive for businesses to embrace benefit sharing. Without
the conservation of natural resources, the industrial supply of
raw materials will constantly be threatened. Creating benefit
sharing agreements with the holders and cultivators of knowl-
edge and resources assures that both parties will have an in-
vestment in the long- and short-term success of the agreement.
Indigenous communities have to consider the possible drastic
and destructive effects of bioprospecting on their environment
and lifestyle. Both indigenous communities and corporations
carefully must plan long term objectives to assure future gen-
erations will be motivated by the same beneficial incentives in
order to continue sustainable use and conservation of protected
natural resources and indigenous knowledge. Agreements must
include provisions to ensure the transfer of benefits. This may
be in the form of trusts funds or some other meaningful com-
pensatory scheme. Replication of the model for the benefit of
future generations is also an important consideration. Through
the enactment of biodiversity legislation, the Government, in
its supervisory role, will legitimize the CBD's request for bene-
fit sharing by enforcing the actual construction of such ar-
rangements. The procedural requirements of written prior
informed consent, and mandatory benefit sharing, provide a
132. Id.
133. Key Terms, supra note 120.
134. Sarma, supra note 2, at 123.
135. CBD, supra note 6.
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sturdy platform for the substantive negotiation of equitable
terms.
Although the TBGRI described the Kani project as one
based on "mutual trust, respect, transparent and free commu-
nication with the Kani tribe... ,,136 there is no evidence that
the Kanis affirmatively agreed to or actively negotiated any of
the fundamental terms of the TBGRI initiated project. The
TBGRI unilaterally determined the allocation of monetary
benefits, the mechanism for distribution, and the form and
nature of the benefit sharing. When the Kanis revealed their
knowledge of Arogyapacha, the TBGRI formulated an ambi-
tious plan to develop, license, patent and market a herbal for-
mulation. The project also required the Kanis' help and in-
volvement in collection and cultivation, in exchange for a 50%
share of the benefits. One of the most significant justifications
for the requirement of mutually agreed terms and equal partic-
ipation in the formulation of benefit sharing models, is the
need to incorporate the cultural considerations and concerns of
tribal communities. While the terms of the project were formu-
lated by the TBGRI with the intent to "demonstrate to the
world that [an] indigenous knowledge system is a valuable
source and the owners of indigenous knowledge should be
rewarded wherever it is utilized for a commercially] viable
product or process,"'37 the good intentions of the TBGRI were
insufficient to transform the Institute's pre-conceived terms
into a "mutual agreement."
i. Monetary Compensation
The TBGRI and the AVP negotiated the licensing fees and
distribution of royalties independently of the Kani tribals."'
The TBGRI then promised to share 50% of the benefits accru-
ing from the sale of a seven-year license and 50% of future
royalties with the Kanis."9 Scathing criticism from political
and tribal welfare groups point to the apportionment of money
promised to the Kanis and call it minuscule compared to the
potential profits from the sale of Jeevani.' ° Although a
136. Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 12.
137. Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 11.
138. Government of India, supra note 20.
139. Id.
140. According to one source,
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spokesperson for the TBGRI indeed boasted that the medicinal
derivative of the indigenous plant is sure to be a "money-spin-
ner,"' the Institute insists that 50% of the two percent roy-
alty is a fair allocation of profits because Jeevani is an experi-
mental drug and a "one to four percent royalty is accepted
worldwide."' The drug has, in fact, proven to be an instant
success, selling quickly within India and to Southeast Asian
countries for Rs.160 per 75 grams.43
Regardless of whether the TBGRIs allocation of royalties
was deemed fair or unfair by critics, the true indication of
[T]he benefit sharing scheme for Arogyapacha saw hurdles right
from the start. On July 22, 1995, the then chief minister of Kerala, A.K.
Antony, was to sign a memorandum of understanding with Arya Vaidya
Pharmacy (AVP), marking the technology transfer from the Tropical Bo-
tanical Garden and Research Institute (TBGRI). It was deferred at the
last minute following intervention from the opposition led by the Commu-
nist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M). The then leader of the opposition,
V.S. Achuthanandan, argued that the license fee was too little consider-
ing the huge international market potential of the formulation. Calling
the agreement a 'sell-out,' he suggested that the license fee could have
run into crores [denomination for 1 million rupees] of rupees. The Marx-
ist leader made a case for state government-run pharmaceutical compa-
nies, such as the Kerala State Drugs and Pharmaceuticals. He contended
that the government could have considered transferring the technology to
a public sector undertaking outside the state. If none of these was feasi-
ble, he recommended the government negotiate with other private drug
companies for a bigger share as royalty. P. Pushpangadan, director,
TBGRI, points out that the license fee of Rs 10 lakh [denomination one
thousand rupees] was adequate as AVP was taking a risk of buying a
product untested in the market. It is a promotional drug, he points out,
adding that a 2 percent royalty is an internationally acceptable norm.
Wonder Herb, supra note 21. Dr. P. Pushpangadan, however, asserted that "ilt is
the highest license fee [paid for a drug based on traditional know-how] in India."
Id.
141. The Director and Chief Coordinator of the Kani project acknowledges the
sales potential and hailed the new drug as a rival to ginseng, claiming "[olur
Jeevani acts like Chinese ginseng . . . [but it is superior, because it does not
contain any steroid." In fact, the TBGRI calculated that each acre of plant matter
would yield Rs. 100,000 ($2,500) at a quantity of 2,000 acres per collection, con-
ducted three times a year. This would yield 15 million dollars U.S. each year, two
percent of those royalties equals $100,000. Kerala's forest minister, P.K. Kurup,
reported that the project provided no benefit from the sale of Arogyapacha because
"lilt is a way of exploiting the tribals by certain lobbies. They [nursery owners]
would ask the Kanis to collect the plant and give them little money or alcohol in
return." NATURE, supra note 18, at 182; Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
142. Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
143. The demand for Jeevani was so high that all supplies sold out and could
not be replenished to meet the demand because the raw plant resources depleted.
Id.
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equitable benefit sharing should be judged by well informed
parties on both sides of the transaction. In the case of the
Kanis, and other indigenous communities, any inflow of funds
is welcomed by the community.'" Equitable compensation in
the form of monetary compensation is extraordinarily effective
so long as the needs and considerations of the community are
earnestly considered. Fundamentally, this requires the partici-
pation of indigenous communities in the benefit sharing negoti-
ations from which the Kanis were excluded.
ii. The Social Effect of Bio-prospecting Activities on the Kani
Tribe
Though the TBGRI's cultivation of Arogyapacha and devel-
opment of Jeevani invited the influx of capital into the Kani
community, it also ushered in issues ranging from intra-tribal
tensions, and additional burdens on natural resources, to a
brand new incentive for the locals to illegally collect plants
from a government restricted site.4 ' Pursuant to the CBD,
the focus of negotiations over mutually agreed terms requires
careful consideration of the short and long-term effects of bio-
prospecting contracts on indigenous communities.'46 Although
the TBGRI is a local government research institute, knowl-
edgeable about the traditional lifestyle and concerns of the
Kanis, the Institute's consideration alone was clearly insuffi-
cient to protect the Kanis from negative social repercus-
sions. 47 A certain degree of change and social impact is inev-
itable for a pristine indigenous community, touched for the
first time by business propositions and resource development.
Nevertheless, corporations and indigenous communities need
to channel negotiations over contract terms to encourage bene-
ficial change, limit negative effects, drastic changes in local
culture, and customs, and burdens on the surrounding biologi-
cal diversity.
Far before the details of the Trust had been finalized by
the TBGRI and the tribe members, tension and rivalry grew
144. See Pushpangadan, supra note 1, at 8.
145. See id.
146. See CBD, supra note 6.
147. Apparently, the two original Kani guides worked for the TBGRI as consul-
tants. The Institute interacts with the tribe through these two liaisons. See
Anuradha, supra note 24, at 7.
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among the Kani families residing in different parts of the re-
gion, as well as between the older and younger generations of
Kani tribe members, due to the introduction of the TBGRI's
project.'48 Although the Kanis are still a small community,
whose members share fundamental cultural commonalities, the
Kanis "are no longer one cohesive unit" and "[there is no uni-
formity in the Kanis perception of the benefit sharing proposed
by the TBGRI."49 The Kanis are disbursed among several
tribal hamlets, each composed of 10-20 families.50 Although
the families of the subdivided units reside not more than 10-20
kilometers 5' from each other, each segment of the communi-
ty has been affected by the TBGRI's work in distinctive ways.
The TBGRI has concentrated its work on the Jeevani produc-
tion with the Kanis of the Gram Panchayat area."2 It is re-
ported that the relationship and the reaction to the TBGRI is
positive in this. particular area. 5 ' However, a short distance
away reside the Kanis of Vithura and Peringamala, who have
a very negative opinion of the TBGRI and the disclosure of
their indigenous knowledge to the Institute." The President
of the Vithura Panchayat has "expressed offense at the fact
that TBGRI has not made the effort to reach out to the Kanis
in his Panchayat area,"'55 as well as anger over the fact that
his hamlet heard about the benefit sharing project through the
newspaper, rather than through the TBGRI or fellow Kani
members themselves.'56 The President added that "this is an
instance when a scientific institution has pirated tribal knowl-
edge for its own benefit, and that the benefit sharing proposal
is a superficial exercise since the Kanis have neither been
consulted nor involved in the exercise."5 ' An additional prob-
lem arose from the TBGRI project's inception; the younger
generation of Kanis eagerly took part in plant collection, even
when the only means of access were smuggled plants from the
148. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
149. See Anuradha, supra note 24, at 7.
150. See id. at 3.
151. See id. at 7.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
1172 [Vol. XXVI:3
REALITIES V. EQUITIES
restricted forest reserves.'58 For the poor, indigenous Kani
community, the tribe's relationship with the TBGRI serves as a
unique opportunity to earn money. The older generation, how-
ever, supported by organizations such as the Kerala Institute
for Research, Training and Development of Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (KIRTADS),'59 regard their tribal
knowledge as sacred and have appealed to the younger genera-
tion to protect the tribe from exploitation of its knowledge and
resources.1
60
One of the shortcomings of the TBGRrs benefit sharing
model is that segments of the Kani community do not feel
sufficiently involved, leaving no incentive for this isolated
membership of the tribe to contribute and benefit from the
project.'6 ' This is illustrative of the need to take an entire
community's interest into consideration when formulating
benefit sharing agreements. Without cognizance of social and
cultural considerations, future generations will lack the neces-
sary incentives and motivation to continue initiated projects
jeopardizing the bedrock of indigenous communities-the envi-
ronment.
3. Mandatory Legal Representation
A third element of the proposed biodiversity legislation,
which is not required by CBD's Article 8(j), but essential to the
effective implementation of the two required CBD terms, is
government sponsored legal counsel to act on behalf of the
local communities. A mandate for PIC and benefit sharing
necessarily requires proper legal representation to facilitate
the direct negotiations between indigenous communities and
158. See id.
159. The Kerala Institute for Research, Training and Development of Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes, (KIRTADS) and the TBGRI have a history of conflict
and tension regarding indigenous communities. KIRTADS "is a research institute
under the Government of Kerala which was set up under directions of the Central
Government [federal government]." Government of India, supra note 20; Anuradha,
supra note 24, at 6. KIRTADS has traditionally promoted the protection of tribal
medicinal knowledge. TBGRI accused KIRTADS of trying to undermine the Kani
project. In 1995, KIRTADS pushed proposals for state legislation that would man-
date government monitoring and approval of any agreements made with Kerala's
indigenous communities. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
160. See Wonder Herb, supra note 21.
161. See Anuradha, supra note 24, at 7.
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business entities. Legal expertise pertaining to local resource
ownership rights, obtaining locals as contractual partners
under employment contracts, and familiarity with state and
local ordinances, are indispensable where both parties are
likely to be unfamiliar with legal issues which could potential-
ly entangle contractual terms. Parties negotiating without
legal counsel will encounter complications regardless of wheth-
er the interested corporation is of Indian or foreign origin.
Timely, adequate, and impartial legal representation is
critical in providing tribal communities with the necessary
leverage to negotiate and implement benefit sharing
agreements.'62 Indigenous communities need legal expertise
to zealously represent and explain their legal rights, options,
and obligations in all contractual negotiations over technology
transfers, access to biodiversity, and compensation for indige-
nous intellectual property.6 ' This facilitates the process of
full disclosure and allows tribe members to grant a truly in-
formed consent. Additionally, the assistance of legal counsel
provides a realistic opportunity for indigenous communities to
bargain for more favorable terms. Finally, legal representation
allows indigenous communities to feel secure in contracting
with transnational corporations because of the assured equali-
ty in bargaining power.
With regard to the actual implementation of the
Arogyapacha project, the TBGRI stated that it had provided
"assistance in the form of access to legal advice to the Kanis in
this [Agasthiya Hills] area.""' The TBGRI, however, in recog-
nizing and acknowledging the importance of legal representa-
tion, nevertheless failed to provide adequate and impartial
counsel capable of vigorously representing the tribals' inter-
ests. There is no indication that the Kanis received counsel to
negotiate fundamental terms, explain the legalities of the
Trust, or explore the possibility of conflicting legal issues such
162. See generally Anuradha, supra note 24, at 11-14.
163. Id.
164. Government of India, supra note 20. As Anuradha describes, the scientists
and researchers at the TBGRI were very protective of the Kanis and the tribe's
general welfare. Poverty, lack of formal education, and the unfamiliar notion of
attaching property rights to natural resources and indigenous knowledge, places
the tribals at disadvantage in negotiating formal bio-prospecting contracts. The
TBGRI-Kani relationship has consistently been described as one of "trust and
faith." Anuradha, supra note 24, at 7.
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as the Forest Department's initial ban on Arogyapacha.
KIRTADS called the deal "unfair""6 5 because the "TBGRI has
not involved the Kanis in the negotiating process."'66
KIRTADS argued further that "the Kanis should be encour-
aged to directly interact with wider society, and administer
their medicinal knowledge according to the terms set forth by
them.' 67
IV. CONCLUSION
Biodiversity legislation incorporating decentralized moni-
toring of contractual negotiations by the government will safe-
guard the procedural requirements implied within any contract
between bio-prospectors and local communities possessing
intellectual property. Secondary issues such as the replication
of benefit sharing models, establishment of electronic databas-
es, allocation of benefits, and distribution of authority within
indigenous communities, will be additional concerns of bio-
prospecting contracts, but those issues only can be resolved
once the larger structural issues are solidified by the legisla-
ture.
India best may fulfill its obligation under the CBD by
incorporating (1) prior informed consent, (2) mandatory benefit
sharing, and (3) appointed legal representation in the spirit of
Article 8(j), in order to pave legally enforceable channels which
are favorable to local communities and industries. The fulfill-
ment of CBD Article 8()'s goals by member states is invaluable
to indigenous populations because the recognition of indige-
nous intellectual property and the sustainable use of natural
resources is essential to each local community's survival. By
re-affirming the sovereignty of the signatories over their own
165. Government of India, supra note 20.
166. Id.
167. K1RTADS suggested that a more equitable partnership would be for the
TBGRI to "consider ways and means to impart technical know-how to the Kanis to
manufacture the drug, and thereby involve them further in the process." Id.
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biological diversity, the CBD encourages members to develop a
workable legislative framework that is appropriate for the
needs and circumstances of their indigenous communities.168
Rekha Ramani
168. See Carmen, Andrea and Alberto Saldamando, Antonio Gonzales and Carol
Kalafatic, Plant Plunder, Genes and Sneakers, in UNITED NATIONS CHRONICLE 28,
Vol. XXXVI No. 1 (1999).
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